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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD K. PLATTS, 
individually and as personal 
representative of THE ESTATE 
OF GARY SCOTT PLATTS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
PARENTS HELPING PARENTS, 
dba TURNABOUT, ALAN COMINS 
and JOHN DOES I through XXXV 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 9400551-CA 
Dist. Ct. No. 910902166 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp.1993). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in holding that defendant's are 
health care providers as defined by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated §78-14-3 (9) (Supp 1993), 
thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction? 
2. Did the trial court err in ordering the Plaintiff to pay 
for the costs of a transcript? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness without any 
special deference to the trial court. Greenwood v. City of North 
Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 818 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The court will be asked to review at least the following 
determinative law: 
1. Utah Code Annotated §78-14-1 et seq. (1993), 
2. Utah Code Annotated §78-14-2 (Supp 1993), 
3. Utah Code Annotated §78-14-3(9) (Supp 1993), 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Platts is the father of Gary Scott Platts ("Gary") . In June of 
1989, Platts' son Gary began having disciplinary and behavioral 
problems. Gary received a referral to Juvenile Court, and as part 
of Gary's probation, he was to complete a program run by 
Defendant/Appellees Parents Helping Parents d/b/a Turnabout 
{"Turnabout" ) and Alan Comins ("Comins" ) . 
On or about June 21, 1989 Platts signed a contract with 
Turnabout for the treatment of his son. In July of 198 9, Gary was 
admitted to Turnabout's program. In February of 1990, Gary was 
truant from the program. Because of his truancy, he was taken out 
of Platts' home and placed with another family. 
On February 27, 1990 at 6:55 a.m., in violation of 
Turnabout's policy to release youth only to their parents, Comins 
and Turnabout released Gary to go to school. Gary did not show up 
at school that morning. That afternoon, Turnabout called Platts to 
see if he knew where Gary was. Sometime after March 1, 1990, Gary 
sneaked into Piatt's home and shot himself. Platts found the body 
of his son Gary on March 4, 1990. 
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On or about March 4, 1991, Platts filed his complaint in 
this action naming Turnabout, Comins and John Does I through XXXV 
as defendants. On or about April 14, 1993, Defendants/Appellees 
moved for summary judgment (R. 871), claiming, inter alia, that 
they were health care providers pursuant to the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated §78-14-1 et seq. (1993), and 
that Platts had failed to comply with the Act. On July 16, 1993, 
Defendants filed a Motion to Amend their Answer to assert the 
affirmative defense that they were a health care provider. R. 1351. 
The trial court concluded that Defendants/Appellees were 
health care providers under the Act, and -that such conclusion 
deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial 
court then granted Defendant's Appellee's motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 1557, 1568, 1569). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants/Appellees are not health care providers. They are 
11
 credentialed addiction counselors" or in the case of Turnabout, a 
support group. CAC's are not included in the statutory definition 
of health care provider. They are not professionals and the 
individual appellees are not licensed by the state. Turnabout is 
licensed by the Department of Human Services, but the services it 
provides are not health care services. The appellees do not provide 
any professional services, their internal documents and their 
advertising documents avoid any reference to the provision of 
health care services. Since the Appellees never described 
themselves as health care providers, they should not now be allowed 
3 
to claim the protections of the statute. 
When the trial court ruled that the Defendants/Appellees were 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and Appellant had 
filed a certificate that no transcript was required, the Appellant 
should not have been ordered to pay for a transcript of the 
proceedings. The transcript does not contain any findings of fact 
or conclusions of law that were challenged by the Appellant, the 
transcript was unnecessary and irrelevant and costs should be 
assessed against the Appellees. 
ARGOMENT 
I. TURNABOUT AND ALAN COMINS ARE NOT "HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS" 
AS THAT TERM IS DEFINED IN THE UTAH HEALTH 
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT. 
The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that Appellees, 
Turnabout and Alan Comins, are "health care providers" as that term 
is defined by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-14-3(9) (1990) (hereinafter "the Act").1 However, a plain 
reading of §78-14-3 of the Act, and the Act in general, fails to 
reveal how Appellees qualify as health care providers. Rather, 
Turnabout is merely a support group that does not provide health 
care related services. As such, Appellant was not required to 
comply with the Act in filing this action. 
Appellees argument to the trial court is based on their 
assumption that since Wiseman and Comins, who operate Turnabout, 
1
 §78-14-3 of the Act was amended, effective April 27, 
1992. The amendment provided for inclusion of "clinical social 
workers" in the Act and proceeded to make minor stylistic changes. 
Since Appellants cause of action accrued prior to the amendments 
effective date, it is not applicable to this appeal. 
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are "credentialed addiction counsellors", they, and Turnabout in 
general, are "health care providers" as that term is used in the 
Health Care Malpractice Act.2 The trial court agreed with this 
argument despite the fact that §78-14-3 is completely devoid of any 
mention of the term "credentialed addiction counselors." Indeed, 
nowhere in the Act is such a term even used. 
An individual reading the Act's plain language would 
reasonably conclude that since the term "credentialed addiction 
counselor" is not mentioned in the Act, an individual claiming to 
be such a counselor is not a health care provider as that term is 
defined in the Act. Therefore, any claims against a "credentialed 
addiction counselor" are not subject to the Act's procedural 
requirements, including presentation to a pre-litigation screening 
panel. Likewise, the services provided by an organization 
employing such an individual are not health care related so as to 
render any claims against such an organization subject to the same 
procedural requirements. 
The trial court erred in ruling that Appellees are "health 
care providers," and its grant of summary judgment should be 
therefore reversed. 
A. Plain Reading of §78-14-3. 
A plain reading of U.C.A. §78-14-3 (1990) reveals that 
Appellees do not fall within the Act. Where, as here, the 
Jack Wiseman is the Director of Turnabout, Alan Comins 
is the Assistant Director. 
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statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court should not 
look beyond the language to divine legislative intent, but rather 
should give effect to the statutes plain language. Allisen v. 
American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). In 
construing a statute, the best evidence of the legislature's intent 
is the plain language of the statute, and this Court's primary 
responsibility is to give effect to that intent. Sullivan v. 
Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 1993); Savage 
Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm., 811 P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 
1991) . 
Section 78-14-3 defines each of the relevant terms used in 
chapter 14. Subsection (9) defines the term "health care provider" 
as follows: 
any person, partnership, association, corporation, or 
other facility or institution who causes to be rendered 
or who renders health care or professional services as a 
hospital, physician, registered nurse, licensed practical 
nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, dental hygienist, 
optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, 
pharmacist, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, 
chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, 
osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon, 
audiologist, speech-language pathologist, clinical social 
worker, certified social worker, social service worker, 
social service aide, marriage and family counselor, 
practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar 
care and services relating to or arising out of the 
health needs of persons or groups of persons and 
officers, employees, agents of any of the above arising 
in the course and scope of their employment. 
U.C.A. §78-14-3(9) (1990). Nowhere is a "credentialed addiction 
counselor" listed or referred to in the definition. Moreover, the 
individuals employed by Appellees do not fit within any of the 
categories provided for by the Act. 
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Of even greater significance is the fact that each separately 
enumerated "person, partnership, association, corporation, or other 
facility or institution" listed in §78-14-3(9), is further defined, 
individually, in subsections (l)-(4), (5), (6), (11), (12), (14)-
(18), (20)-(26), (28)-30) of §78-14-3. As stated by this Court, in 
Cannon v. McDonald, 615 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1980): 
"When a statute uses technical words and phrases which are 
defined by the statute, the statute must be construed 
according to such peculiar and appropriate meanings or 
definitions." 
Id. at 1270. 
The definitions provided in the subsections listed above 
reference the relevant chapters of Title 58 of the Utah Code, which 
governs the licensing procedures and requirements for each 
separately enumerated "person, partnership, association, 
corporation, or other facility or institution" listed in §78-14-
3(9). Each individual listed in §78-14-3(9) is licensed by the 
State of Utah pursuant to Title 58. Again, a "credentialed 
addiction counselor" is neither listed or defined in any of the 
subsections to §78-14-3. Further, Title 58 makes no mention of 
"credentialed addiction counselors," as such individuals are not 
licensed as professionals by the State. The import of this 
•* The language contained at the end of §78-14-3(9) refers 
to "others rendering similar care and services . . . " Under common 
rules of statutory construction, such as noscitur a sociis, vit is 
known from its associates, ' and ejusdem generis, vof the same 
kind,' general terms such as these must be given a meaning 
"restricted to a sense analogous to the preceding specific terms." 
Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673 (Utah 1989) . As such, "others 
rendering similar care and services" must refer to individuals who 
are licensed by the State pursuant to Title 58. 
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omission is that the Utah Legislature, in drafting the Health Care 
Malpractice Act, did not consider a "credentialed addiction 
counselor" to be a health care provider. Likewise, the services 
rendered by such individuals, or organizations operated by them, 
are not health care related services. Thus, the legislature did 
not intend actions against "credentialed addiction counselors" to 
be subject to the procedural requirements of the Act. 
If the legislature did consider "credentialed addiction 
counselors" to be health care providers, it need only have said so, 
by adding "credentialed addiction counselor" or "addiction 
counselor" t.o the comprehensive list of professions contained in 
§78-14-3(9), or licensed by the State pursuant to Title 58. Its 
failure to do provides a indication of its intent. See e.g. City 
of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wyo. 1993) (where 
statute enumerates subjects or things on which it operates, or 
persons affected, it is construed as excluding from its effect all 
those not expressly mentioned under rule of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius) ; Kreidler v. Eikenberry, 766 P.2d 438 (Wash. 
1989) (express mention of one thing in statute implies exclusion of 
another). 
B. Appellees are Not Professionals Licensed by the State. 
The qualifications for working at Turnabout include having had 
experiences similar to the troubled youths who participate in 
Turnabouts' programs. "Personal recovery would be a consideration." 
(R. 1054, Wiseman depo. p. 20). Alan Comins and Jack Wiseman are 
"credentialed addiction counselors" (R. 1081, 1049-1050, Wiseman 
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depo. p. 4 - 5) . However, as set forth above, no where in the 
Health Care Malpractice Act is a "credentialed addiction counselor" 
listed as a health care provider. Nor is such an individual 
licensed by the State of Utah pursuant to Title 58 of the Utah 
Code. Each of the enumerated "persons, partnerships, associations, 
corporations, or other facilities or institutions" listed in §78-
14-3(9) is licensed by the State of Utah pursuant to Tile 58. A 
review of the qualifications of the director and assistant director 
of Turnabout shows that neither Wiseman nor Comins are licensed by 
the State of Utah. (R.1049 & 1081). 
One would reasonably expect that a health care provider would 
in fact be licensed by the State to provide such services. Thus, 
the fact that Appellees are not licensed by the State is further 
evidence that they are not health care providers. The simple fact 
is, neither Wiseman nor Comins are licensed in any fashion by the 
State. (R.1081 & 1049) . If the State of Utah recognized recovering 
drug or alcohol addicts as health care providers, it would license 
and regulate them pursuant to Title 58. At this time, the State 
does neither. 
In August of 1993, an article appeared in the Salt Lake 
Tribune describing a proposed bill which would subject "addiction 
counselors," who currently not regulated by the State, to State 
licensing requirements. (R. 1495). Subsequently, a bill was 
introduced into the Utah State Legislature entitled the "Mental 
Health Professional Practice Act." R. 1496, 1539. 
Included in the bill is a specific provision aimed at 
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requiring "certified addiction counselors" to obtain a license from 
the State. See R. 1531, proposed U.C.A. §58-60-601 et.seq. Both 
the article and the proposed bill recognize that addiction 
counselors, such as Wiseman and Comins, are not currently regulated 
by the State, whether as professionals or as "health care 
providers." 
Appellees entire argument, and indeed the trial court's ruling 
on their Motion for Summary Judgment, is based upon the assumption 
that Appellees are "health care providers." However, a plain 
reading of the Act demonstrates that Appellees are not "health care 
providers" as that term is defined in the Act itself. Therefore, 
the trial court's ruling was erroneous. 
II. APPELLEES DO NOT PROVIDE PROFESSIONAL OR 
HEALTH CARE RELATED SERVICES. 
A. Documents provided to the Utah Dept. of Commerce. 
Turnabouts' Articles of Incorporation, filed in March 1986, 
(R. 1091) state that the purpose of the corporation is to: 
serve the public as a support and self help entity for 
families and neighborhoods, to serve the public as a 
crisis-intervention program, structuring group meetings 
to support parents and spouses in demanding responsible 
cooperation of out-of-control family members; to acquaint 
parents and others with community services available to 
meet their needs; to do all things reasonably necessary 
in order to serve the purpose of the corporation as set 
forth above; and to do any and all other things 
consistent with our non-profit status and within the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
(R. 1091-1099) . Turnabout amended its Article of Incorporation in 
July 1986. (R. 1095). The amended Articles of Incorporation list 
the purposes of the corporation as being: 
to serve the public as a support and self help entity for 
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families and neighborhoods, to serve the public as a 
crisis-intervention program, structuring group meetings 
to support parents and spouses in demanding responsible 
cooperation of out-of-control family members; to acquaint 
parents and others with community services available to 
meet their needs to promote education of the public and 
our membership with respect to alcohol/drug abuse; to 
promote through education: awareness, prevention, 
intervention, treatment and aftercare of youth with 
alcohol/drug problems and or behavior problems. To 
lessen neighborhood tensions by conducting forums for the 
discussion of family problems and offer one another 
support for those parents and individuals seeking 
solutions to their problems; to aid those that can not 
afford the help they need through donations or finding 
agency help; to act as "host" homes for one-another's 
children, to aid in combating abuse, both child and 
parental. To create, design, and run programs that 
benefit the general mental health of the community, 
combat juvenile delinquency and lessen work loads on 
existing programs both governmental and private. Said 
corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, 
educational and scientific purposes... 
(See R. 1095). 
Turnabout, however, does not list or designate counseling, therapy 
or health care services as services it provides under its Articles 
of Incorporation. 
The annual report in 1987 (R. 1101) provided to the Department 
of Business Regulation states that the type of business conducted 
by Turnabout in this State is- "educational". Their 1988 annual 
report lists the type of business as "support groups". ( R.1102). 
Their 1989 annual report lists the type of business as 
"miscellaneous". (R.1103). Their 1990 annual report again lists 
the type of business conducted by Turnabout in this State as 
"miscellaneous". (R.1104). 
Based upon their own filings to the Utah Department of 
Commerce, Appellees do not provide any professional or health care 
related services. 
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B. Documents Provided to Utah Dept. of Human Services 
In order to provide the services which it does, Turnabout is 
required to obtain a license from the Department of Human Services. 
The Department licenses programs and not individuals. See U.C.A. 
§62A-2-103 (1991) . In the court below, Appellees emphasize the 
fact that Turnabout's program is licensed by the State, albeit the 
Department of Human Resources. However, program licensed by the 
Department of Human Services does not, ipso facto, render it a 
"health care provider" for purposes of the Health Care Malpractice 
Act, which is administered by the Department of Commerce. 
As set forth in the affidavit of Kenneth Stettler, a licensing 
specialist with the Department of Human Services, if an individual 
is a "health care provider" as defined by U.C.A. §78-14-3(9), they 
are licensed not by the Department of Human Services, but by the 
Department of Commerce. R. 1200, p. 3, KH 8-9. Moreover, 
"certified addiction counsellors" are not included in the list of 
"professionals" that may supervise others under the Departments' 
regulations. Id. at p. 4, f 10. 
The documents provided to the Department of Human Services by 
Turnabout to obtain a license for their program list the services 
Turnabout provides. (R. 1105-1109). R. 1105 states Turnabout's 
program philosophy as follows: 
The philosophy of this organization believes that 
youth can learn to make choices through structure and 
support. Turnabout is designed to challenge destructive 
and uncooperative behavior. Turnabout has a strong 
directional orientation toward the basic program 
guidelines practiced in the twelve (12) step approach 
methods utilized by Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics 
Anonymous. 
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No where is counseling, therapy or other types of health care 
related services mentioned. If Turnabout is found to be a health 
care provider, then it would appear that Alcoholics Anonymous must 
also be considered a health care provider. Can it reasonably be 
inferred that the legislature intended to bring about such a 
result, e.g. subject Alcoholics Anonymous to the provisions of the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act? 
Paragraph 3 of that document (R. 1105) states the services 
provided by Turnabout. "Turnabout will provide comprehensive day 
treatment human services." (See R.1105, f 3). Counseling or 
therapy is not mentioned and human services are not defined. 
In another informational document provided to the State,for 
licensure purposes, the only reference to counseling is: "Final 
involvement could be actual peer counseling and involvement in a 
staff internship participation." (R. 1106). If "peer" counseling 
was provided, it was not provided by the staff of Turnabout, it was 
provided by Gary Platts' "peers". It is unlikely that any of 
Gary's peers, themselves in a program for "delinquent, dependent or 
out of control youth and/or status offenders," are, or consider 
themselves to be, health care providers. 
A definition of "human services program" is set forth 
in §62A-2-101(12), and provides "Human services program" means: 
a youth program or a facility or program that provides 
secure treatment, inpatient treatment, residential 
treatment, residential support, adult or child day care, 
day treatment, outpatient treatment, comprehensive mental 
health treatment, comprehensive abuse treatment, domestic 
violence treatment, child placing services, or driving 
under the influence-educational services. 
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C. Brochures used by Turnabout. 
Brochures used by Turnabout never use the words counselling or 
therapy. In answer to "What is Turnabout?" one brochure, (R. 
1107), states: 
Cooperation of Family and Troubled Youth 
Turnabout has a weekly group meeting for both the 
parent(s) and any other children in the family to 
effect a spirit of cooperation that will bring 
about change. Turnabout does not attempt to 
replace treatment centers. It sees itself as: 
1. Intervention to address problems 
before they have gone too far. 
2. As intense, structured supervision 
tor troubled youth who have gone through a 
treatment center and returned to old patterns 
of behavior. In this capacity, we act as 
support for the family, youth and treatment 
center to get the individual back on track. 
Turnabout uses and refers to professional 
counselors. 
Turnabout uses time-proven, peer pressure 
techniques in group settings to bring about 
positive changes and reinforce them.... Most of 
all, we offer the personnel to check and verify 
that youth are where they should be when they 
should be. 
Turnabouts7 brochure states that they refer individuals to 
professional counselors. (R. 1107) It does not mention that 
Turnabout itself provides counseling, therapy, or other health 
related services. 
Another brochure, (R. 1109), states: 
Turnabout does what parents would do if they had the time 
and the resources. Turnabout uses time-proven peer 
pressure techniques in group settings to bring about 
positive change and reinforce them. 
* * * * * 
Turnabout is also a group of people who are there when 
you need the support of others who are familiar with the 
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problems and pressures of America's youth. If a youth has 
run away, we will look for them; truant from school, we 
will monitor them; abusive in the home, we will come 
there; using drugs or alcohol, we will provide direction 
and support. 
Turnabout's own brochures spell out what Turnabout is. It is 
"structured supervision for troubled youths." (R. 1107). The 
services described are not health care related, but are all manual 
or ministerial, i.e., looking for children, monitoring the children 
at school, and coming to the child's home. None of the services 
described by Turnabout are in the realm of professional or health 
care related services. 
D. Admission Agreement. 
The admission agreement, signed by the parties, R. 1110-1111, 
gave Turnabout the following powers: 
a. MEDICAL TREATMENT AND TESTING. To provide and 
obtain for the client any and all medical treatment and 
hospital care which the client may, in the judgment or 
Turnabout, require and to request and obtain blood and/or 
urine samples of the client for drug and/or alcohol 
testing when, in the judgment of Turnabout, such testing 
should be performed, provided that Turnabout shall obtain 
such treatment, care, and testing only from licensed 
medical doctors and other health providers. Financial 
responsibility is the sponsors. 
b. GUIDANCE AND DISCIPLINE. To guide and 
discipline the client as deemed reasonable and prudent by 
Turnabout, excluding corporal punishment. 
c. RESTRAINT. To physically restrain the client 
should the client become, in the judgment of Turnabout, 
a danger to himself or herself or to someone else. 
The powers granted to Turnabout pursuant to the agreement 
demonstrate that Turnabout did not view itself as treating health 
care needs. The agreement is cleverly drafted to make unsuspecting 
parents think that Turnabout has professionals on staff who are 
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fully licensed by the State of Utah and capable of providing 
medical and other health related treatment and care. The facts 
however, show otherwise. 
Both Comins and Wiseman testified that Turnabout did not 
employ any counselors or health care providers licensed by the 
State of Utah in 1990, other than Mary McGee, who is a licensed 
social worker. (R. 1075, 1084-1087). Further, the admission 
agreement does even not mention counseling, therapy or any other 
health care services as part of the services provided by Turnabout. 
E. Initial Treatment Plan. 
The initial treatment plan for Gary Platts, R. 1089, lists the 
following goals/plan for Gary Platts: 
No running away; no alcohol or drug use including 
tobacco; no violence or threats of violence; follow all 
rules and laws; full attendance and participation in 
school; open communication with family. Client [Gary 
Platts] will attend all assigned groups and activities at 
Turnabout; client's alcohol and drug abuse will be 
monitored by Turnabout; client's behavior will be 
monitored by Turnabout. 
No where does the initial treatment plan mention counseling, 
therapy or any other health care services as part of the goals/plan 
for Gary, or as part of the services to be provided by Turnabout to 
him. 
F. Progress Notes. 
Progress notes document the client's progress every thirty 
days. (R. 1077, 1078). A review of these notes kept by Turnabout 
on Gary Platts reveals that no counseling, therapy or other type of 
health care services were ever provided to Gary. The progress 
notes, which in most cases were entered by Wiseman, reveal only 
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ministerial functions were performed. They list Gary's goals as 
follows: 
1. No running away; 
2. No alcohol or drug use including tobacco; 
3. No violence or threats of violence; 
4. Follow all rules and laws. 
The notes simply do not reflect or document that Gary Platts ever 
received, or Turnabout ever provided any professional or health 
care services. 
G. Daily Logs. 
Finally, the daily logs of Turnabout on Gary Platts, cover the 
entire period of Gary's attendance. (R.1119). Like the progress 
notes discussed above, the daily logs do not reveal that any 
professional or health care services were rendered to Gary, other 
than general supervision. Examples include: 
client has missed 6 consecutive groups, Gary has attended 
all assigned groups, Gary has chosen to live out of the 
house, Gary has processed in group, his thoughts to run 
away, Gary was confronted in group for smoking marijuana, 
Dad left Gary, forgot to pick him up, Gary called to say 
he would not be in. 
H. Internal Policy Manual. 
Turnabout's policy and procedure manual lists job descriptions 
for the director, assistant director and the clinical director of 
the program. (R.1130). No where in these job descriptions is 
counseling, therapy, or other health care related services listed 
as a duty of either the director, assistant director or the 
clinical director of the program. 
I. Conclusion. 
Turnabout is and was a support group. The qualifications of 
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its director and assistant director are that they have had previous 
problems with their own children or had their own prior addictions. 
(R. 1054, 1088). Turnabout never use terms such as counseling, 
therapy or health care because it does not provide such services, 
nor do they have the professionals on staff who could provide those 
services. 
None of the activities or services provided by Turnabout arise 
out of a vocation or occupation involving specialized knowledge or 
skills; although the program coordinators may have hoodwinked the 
parents into believing that professional counseling services were 
part of the expensive Turnabout program, no such professional 
services were included in the program fee. Supervision, 
discipline, punishment and monitoring, the services provided by 
Turnabout, were not even actually provided by Turnabout, Wiseman or 
Comins. (R. 1053-54, 1061, 1074-75, 1088). Rather, the children in 
the program and their families, by using "time-proven peer pressure 
techniques in group settings to bring about positive changes and 
reinforce them," (R. 1105-1109) are the actual service providers. 
The activities of Turnabout do not constitute professional or 
health care related service. Similarly, the certifications held by 
Wiseman and Comins do not qualify them as professionals or "health 
care providers." As such, the trial court erred in ruling, as a 
matter of law, that Appellees are "health care providers" as that 
term is defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEES MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
REMAINED UNRESOLVED. 
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Summary judgment is appropriate only when, taking the facts 
and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party, it appears that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and where, according to the facts asserted by 
the non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to relief as a 
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); Alf v. State 
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274. All facts, and 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in a light most 
favorable to the moving party. Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 
854 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah 1993). 
The services provided by Appellees are not professional or 
health care services, nor are the people providing the services 
health care providers or even professionals. At the very least, 
disputed issues of fact remained as to the nature of the services 
Appellees actually provided, and whether those services can be 
considered health care related so as to bring Appellees within the 
Health Care Malpractice Act. This alone should have precluded a 
grant of summary judgment on the issue. 
By way of example, in the case of St Paul Fire and Marine Ins. 
Co. v. Parents Helping Parents, dba Turnabout; Alan Comins, and 
Ronald Platts, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
Civil No. 920905828 (hereinafter "St. Paul"), the plaintiff 
insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing that because 
the suit by Ronald Platts arose from the performance of 
"professional services" by Turnabout and Comins, plaintiff had no 
duty to defend or indemnify either Turnabout or Comins. Judge 
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Frank G. Noel denied the insurance company's motion for summary 
judgment, finding that there is a fact issue as to whether 
Turnabout and Comins were providing professional services.5 
As in St. Paul, in the instant suit a fact issue remains as to 
whether Turnabout and Comins were providing professional or health 
care services. As demonstrated by section II of Appellant's 
argument, even if this Court does not find Appellees are not 
"health care providers" as a matter of law, issues of material fact 
remain as to whether the services Appellees rendered are 
professional or health care related. 
The trial court granted Appellees' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, finding that Appellees were health care providers and 
therefore the trial court no longer had subject matter 
jurisdiction. The court then dismissed Appellants' suit with 
prejudice. Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment, reinstate his suit, 
and remand for further proceedings. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PLAINTIFF 
APPELLANT TO PAY FOR THE COSTS OF A TRANSCRIPT. 
The Appellees brought a Motion in the Trial Court to have the 
Plaintiff/Appellant provide a transcript of the August 23, 1993, 
hearing on Defendants7 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
^ It is interesting to note that Appellees only possess 
a general liability insurance policy. §78-14-2, which sets forth 
the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, notes that the 
Act is a response, in part, to the increased costs of "medical 
malpractice insurance." Here, Appellees do not even have medical 
malpractice insurance, ostensibly because they do not provide 
health care related services. 
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Plaintiff/Appellant had previously filed a Certificate that No 
Transcript was Necessary. (R. 1566) Defendants claimed that such 
a transcript is required to "advise the appellate court as to 
claims plaintiff has stated he will make on appeal, namely that 
this Court erred in holding that defendants were health care 
providers." (R. 1575-1577).6 
This appeal is taken from such part of the order and judgment 
granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment whereby the 
District Court held, as a matter of law, that Defendants' are 
"healthcare providers" as defined by Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. The trial court heard argument on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on or about August 23, 1993, but did not rule on 
the Motion at that hearing. Rather, the trial court made its 
ruling by way of a minute entry on January 27, 1994, (R. 1557) 
stating, in pertinent part, that: 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for 
the reasons set forth in defendants' Memorandum in 
Support and in Reply thereto, limited however to this 
Court's determination that defendants are 'health care 
providers' as defined by the Utah Healthcare Malpractice 
Act, thereby depriving this Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
It is not at all clear why the trial court ordered the 
Plaintiff to provide a transcript or why the appellate court needs 
to be "advised" by way of a transcript as to Piatt's claims on 
appeal. Platts has not attempted to keep his "claims" secret. 
° Defendants' second argument, that they will be required 
to "incur substantial costs and fees relative to this appeal" due 
to Platts decision to file this appeal, and therefore Platts should 
be "compelled to request a transcript" is frivolous. Appellant has 
already provided a cost bond to cover the cost of the appeal. 
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After all, Platts has filed a Statement of Issues on Appeal, 
specifically "advising" both the appellate court and Defendants 
that the precise issue to be challenged is whether the trial court 
properly granted Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment; in 
finding, as a matter of law, that Defendants are "health care 
providers" as defined by the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act. 
Moreover, this appeal does not involve a claim by Platts that 
the trial courts' findings of fact are unsupported by or contrary 
to the evidence. see e.g. Utah R. App. Proc. 11(e) (2) ; Sawyers v. 
Sawyers, 558 P. 2d 607, 608 (Utah 1976) (citing to Mitchell v. 
Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359, 1360-61 (Utah 1974)) (where points on 
appeal involve factual determination, transcript of hearing 
required) . The trial court made no findings of fact for Platts to 
appeal, or the appellate court to review. The trial court, in 
granting Defendants' Motion, merely adopted the "reasons set forth 
in defendants' Memorandum in Support and in Reply thereto." R. 
1557. 
Thus, the transcript of the August 23, 1993 hearing does not 
contain any findings of fact or conclusions of law made by the 
trial court. It only contains the legal arguments of counsel and 
questions posed by the trial court. Defendants have not indicated 
why a transcript of the arguments made before the trial court, or 
the questions posed to counsel, is in any way relevant to this 
appeal. Neither party is required to make the exact arguments to 
the appellate court as were made before the trial court. Nor is 
the appellate court required to pose the same questions to the 
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parties as were posed by the trial court. 
In reviewing the trial court's ruling, the appellate court 
need only look to Defendants' Memorandum in Support and in Reply to 
their Motion for Summary Judgment. This is what the trial court 
relied on in reaching its decision. Both Memorandum are contained 
in the record on appeal. As such, a transcript of the August 23, 
1993 hearing was both unnecessary and irrelevant, and the trial 
court's order granting Defendants' Motion should be Reversed, and 
the costs of the transcript assessed against the 
Defendants/Appellees. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment should be REVERSED. Appellees are not "health 
care providers11 as that term is defined in the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, and therefore are not subject to the provisions of 
the Act. The services Appellees render are not health care 
related. Appellees have failed to sustain their burden of proof 
for summary judgment to be granted on the issue. As such, 
Appellant was not required to comply with the Act and the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue. 
Additionally, the trial court's ruling that the Plaintiff 
obtain and pay for a transcript of the hearing of August 23, 1993 
should be reversed and the costs assessed to the Appellees. 
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DATED this /*•/ day of November, 1994. 
CAROLYN NICHOLS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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